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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ALIENS- CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
REGULATION DEMANDING CITIZENSHIP AS A PREREQUISITE TO EM-
PLOYMENT DEPRIVES RESIDENT ALIENS OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW.
Five resident aliens, who were either denied federal employment or de-
nied an opportunity for such employment because they failed to meet
citizenship requirements embodied in applicable regulations' brought a
class action challenging the employment policies and regulations of the
Civil Service Commission and other federal agencies.' Plaintiffs argued
that (1) the regulation requiring citizenship as a prerequisite to admission
to a competitive examination used in hiring employees was inconsistent
with certain Executive Orders3 and that (2) the arbitrary advantage given
to citizens over resident aliens offended the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.' After finding no inconsistencies among the federal provi-
sions, the District Court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation on
the grounds that governmental interests existed which were sufficient to
justify the exercise of extensive federal power over aliens. 5 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the lower court's analysis of the nonconstitutional
issues but found the regulation violative of the due process clause of the
Respondent Kae Chong Lui lost his job with the Postal Service solely because he was not
a citizen. Mow Sun Wong, an electrical engineer, was not eligible for a janitor's position for
that same reason. Sin Hung Moi, a businessman with 18 years experience in China, could
not qualify as a file clerk. A teacher with 15 years experience and a Master's Degree in
Education, Francine Lum, was not allowed to take the preparatory steps to become an
evaluator of educational programs with HEW. Ann Yu, not joining in the appeal, was not
permitted to take a typing exam, a prerequisite for a clerk-typist position. Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90-92 (1976).
2 Civil Service Commission regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (Supp. 1975) reads:
(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a citizen
of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or owes perma-
nent allegiance to the United States. However, a noncitizen may be given (1) a
limited executive assignment under section 305.509 of the chapter in the absence
of qualified citizens or (2) an appointment in rare cases under section 316.601 of
this chapter, unless the appointment is prohibited by statute.
The only persons, other than citizens, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States
are noncitizen "nationals." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(21), (22), 1408 (1952). The Solicitor
General construes this phrase as covering only natives of American Samoa. 426 U.S. at 90
n.1.
' Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 446 (Supp. 1970), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e note (1969),
forbids discrimination in federal employment on the basis of "national origin." See also
Public Works Appropriation Act of 1970, 83 Stat. 323, 336-37, (1969), especially section 502.
But see Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976), infra note 44. Note that this order
was issued after the Supreme Court handed down the Hampton decision.
' U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without the due process of law ... "
' Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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fifth amendment.' On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. A Civil Service Commission regulation demanding citizenship as
a prerequisite to employment deprives resident aliens of liberty without
due process of law and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
Traditionally the judiciary has taken a deferential attitude toward con-
gressional and executive action where aliens are concerned.' This deference
stems in large part from a recognition of the broad constitutional grant of
authority to Congress to control the naturalization of aliens.8 Even so, the
regulation of aliens is still subject to the limitations on governmental ac-
tion imposed by the Constitution9 and Hampton is a landmark case in
judicial intervention into the federal regulation of aliens to enforce these
limitations. The Hampton analysis parallels that which is applied by the
Court in reviewing cases of state discrimination against aliens, and there-
fore, warrants a discussion of the reasoning in those cases.
Challenges to state legislation alleging discrimination may be brought
under the fourteenth amendment or, more specifically, under the equal
protection clause of that amendment. 0 In assessing the validity of such
state legislation, the Court in recent cases has employed what has become
known as the "new equal protection analysis."'" Under this approach, the
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1971).
E.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) finding that "[tihe authority to control
immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal Government." See
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, infra note 9.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. "The Congress shall have Power . .. [tlo establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization."
I Id. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1892), where the Court
held,
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be
regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive
authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial
department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the
paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene.
Id. (emphasis added).
1* For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court found the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to be "universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdic-
tion, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1885). See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
" See Note, Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination Against Aliens,
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 355, 361-70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimination].
This note discusses the changing theories behind retricting alien employment, and the
constitutional limitation on such restrictions. At first, employment was considered a public
resource, and regulations preserving this "special public interest" were subjected to only the
most relaxed standards of review under the equal protection clause. The second theory al-
lowed discriminatory statutes on the basis that they were a proper exercise of police power.
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) for a discussion and rejection of these theories.
In light of the "equal protection under equal laws" granted to aliens in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
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Court has first inquired whether the enactment involves a "suspect classi-
fication"'' 2 or violates a "fundamental right."' 3 If either of these character-
supra note 10, the Court began to require a showing of a "compelling State interest" to justify
the regulation of aliens, rather than supposing a proper legislative purpose to support the
enactment as traditionally was done under the minimum rationality test. Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
This 'more searching judicial inquiry' has become the 'new equal protection' .
[and] . ..reflects two trends in the Court's jurisprudence under the equal protec-
tion clause. First, it evidences the development and expansion of 'fundamental
rights' which, when restricted by state action, require 'strict scrutiny' by the Court.
Second, the Court will searchingly review state legislation where the statute's clas-
sification is constitutionally 'suspect'.
Employment Discrimination, supra at 363. The reviewing court "searches" for a compelling
governmental interest which will justify the infringement of the individual's rights. See text
accompanying notes 12-13 for further discussion of suspect classifications and fundamental
rights.
2 Justice Stone, in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 n. 4 (1938), gave
birth to the heightened review of suspect classifications when he noted: "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Another commentator indicates:
'Suspect classification' has never been adequately defined by the Court. It is appar-
ently limited to (1) classes determined solely by birth, and (2) classes which have
been historically disadvantaged. Although the Burger Court seems to be retreating
from the expansion of suspect classifications of the Warren Court era, the following,
at least, seem clearly established: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (religion and national origin); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage).
Employment Discrimination, supra note 11, at 363 n.44. In his dissenting opinion in Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), Justice Rehnquist found no support in the Constitution
for defining alienage as a suspect classification. He contended that the citizenship clause of
the fourteenth amendment was designed to deal with the limited problem of racial questions
arising from the Dred Scott decision. 413 U.S. at 649 (dissenting opinion).
Commentators have pointed out that aliens may become naturalized citizens and escape
blanket discrimination.
Under the new equal protection analysis, a regulation must promote a compelling govern-
mental interest in order to justify discrimination by "suspect classification" or the impair-
ment of "fundamental rights." (See note 13 infra for a further discussion of fundamental
rights.) Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAxv. L. REv. 1, 13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
1 According to Gunther, supra note 12 at 8, "[tlhe fundamental interests ingredient of
the new equal protection was particularly open-ended." The breadth of the term allowed the
courts to avoid the lack of support in the constitutional text and in precedent and to serve
the expanding concept of individual rights as the justices were individually inspired.
Certain interests, such as the right to earn a livelihood, have long been recognized. Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) stated rather succinctly "that the right to work for a living
in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure" [citations
omitted], deciding that the equal protection clause would be made meaningless if the right
to work could be denied solely on the grounds of nationality or race.
The rejection of the idea that employment was a "public resource", see note 11 supra,
undermined another avenue to exempt the discrimination from constitutional limitations.
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istics was found to exist, the Court has abandoned its traditional practice
of presuming that a proper legislative purpose exists behind the statute
(known as the minimum rationality test). Instead the legislation has been
subjected to a "strict judicial scrutiny," demanding a showing of "compel-
ling governmental interest" which justifies the discrimination.'
The Court has recently applied the new equal protection analysis to
state regulations in cases factually similar to the present case but involving
only state discrimination.'5 In Sugarman v. Dougall the Court found a
requirement of citizenship as a prerequisite for employment by the New
York Civil Service Commission unconstitutional.'" The government had
argued that aliens working in the Civil Service would endanger the execu-
tion and formulation of policy, and that the interest in preserving the
political community justified the discrimination. Recognizing that alien-
age is a suspect classification, 8 the Sugarman court applied strict judicial
scrutiny and rejected the regulation because it was not sufficiently justi-
fied'9 by a governmental interest to remain within the bounds of the Con-
stitution. Thus, the Sugarman court decided the case under a suspect
classification analysis. The Court also emphasized its duty of protection
The exercise of the police power, protecting the political community, may justify imposing
conditions such as citizenship on public employment; but under the new equal protection
analysis these conditions must be justified by the claimed governmental interests. See note
11 supra.
For a more in depth discussion, see Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?,
61 GEO. L.J. 207 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. at 732 (1892) (Brewer, Field and Fuller, J.J. dissenting).
11 See note 11 supra, and Gunther, supra note 12.
Gunther discusses the mounting discontent with the two-tiered equal protection. He points
out the courts' tendencies to eliminate the distinction between strict and minimal scrutiny,
asking instead the question of whether an appropriate governmental interest is suitably
furthered by the discriminating treatment. Id. at 19.
This "newer equal protection" set out by Gunther does not necessarily eradicate the old
suspect classifications and the judicial inquiry triggered thereby, but will essentially be a
specific application of the standards invoked by all equal protection claims. The move toward
the newer equal protection analysis is evidenced by the holding in Sugarman v. Dougall, infra
note 15, where the court stressed that the governmental means employed were not sufficiently
related to the interest protected. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
IS See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
See generally Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 1012 (1957).
' 413 U.S. at 646.
' Id. at 641.
" Id. at 642.
" Id. at 646. "The cumulative impact of Graham, Sugarman, and Griffiths is clear: the
states will not be permitted to restrict alien employment unless such employment constitutes
participation in the 'basic conception of the political community'." Employment
Discrimination, supra note 11, at 365-66 (footnotes omitted). See also Travers, The Constitu-
tional Status of State and Federal Governmental Discrimination Against Resident Aliens, 16
HARv. INT'L L.J. 113 (1975).
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of aliens "who work for a living in the common occupations of the com-
munity, 2 0 implying that the requirement curtailed the exercise of an indi-
vidual's right to work.'
The plaintiffs in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, though presenting a case
in which the facts were quite similar to Sugarman, could not invoke the
protection of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause which
expressly deals only with state action, because only federal regulations
were involved.2 They alleged instead the denial of due process of law under
the fifth amendment, which applies to federal action but contains no ex-
press equal protection clause" to support the use of a suspect classification
analysis. The Court in Hampton declines to imply the same fourteenth
amendment equal protection limitation as regards the federal government
into the fifth amendment or to extend to a federal regulation the suspect
classification analysis applied to states.2 Rather, the Court finds that the
enforcement of the regulaton would result in the aliens' ineligibility for
employment in a major sector of the economya and that this disadvantage
is of "sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an
interest in liberty, '26 requiring due process of law.
Although the Court looks to the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment as the plaintiffs' protective umbrella, it determines that "the concept
of equal justice under law is served by the fifth amendment's guarantee of
due process, as well as by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."" Suggesting that the two amendments require the same
2 413 U.S. at 641, citing Truax v. Raich, supra note 13.
2 See note 13 supra.
2 The plaintiffs suing the federal Civil Service Commission could not fall within the "any
state" language of the fourteenth amendment. Any attack on federal regulation must be
through the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
For the pertinent text of the fifth amendment see note 4 supra.
See note 4 supra.
2, 426 U.S. at 100. Compare the Court of Appeals approach in Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton,
supra note 6.
426 U.S. at 102. See notes 13 and 19 concerning the right to work.
Id. at 102 (emphasis added). See Gunther's discussion, supra note 12, regarding the
Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the categorization of "suspect classification" and "fun-
damental rights" and compare the Hampton court's evasive language of "interest in liberty."
A comparison of the practical application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the due process clause of the fifth will show that traditionally the equal
protection clause has been considered a "more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
.... [blut . . .discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 499 (1954). Expanding concepts of liberty, however, allow the
court to employ the fifth amendment more freely. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
See also Gunther supra note 11, at 8, 37-39. Generally, federal classifications needed only to
be reasonable and not meet the more demanding standards of "compelling governmental
interest." Employment Discrimination, supra note 11, at 367-68. But see text accompanying
notes 27-32 infra.
27 426 U.S. at 100. See Weinberger v. Wisenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975), holding that
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type of analysis, 28 the Hampton court refers to the alien plaintiffs with
language such as "an identifiable and disadvantaged class of persons, '2 9
sounding much like the suspect classification language of the new equal
protection analysis.30 The Court's discussion of the aliens' interest in civil
service employment as attaining the heights of an "interest in liberty' 3' is
reminiscent of descriptions of "fundamental rights," such as those pro-
tected under the second prong of the new equal protection scheme.32
Paradoxically, while the Court applies much the same analysis to federal
action challenged under the due process clause of the fifth amendment as
it would have applied to state action under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, it refuses to take the final step of proclaiming
that equal protection is implied in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 33 By finding that the two amendments are not coextensive,
the Court differentiates between the protection afforded the individual
against state action and his protection where only the federal government
is involved.3 The Court believes, for example, that there are "overriding
national interests which could justify selective federal legislation which
would be unacceptable for the States." 3
Without explaining the differences between the equal protection right
expressed in the fourteenth amendment and the "liberty" rights under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court effectively decides
the case on the issue of the delegation of authority to regulate aliens.3
Examining the history of the Civil Service Act and the accompanying
legislation,37 the Court finds that the various Executive Orders did not
"[while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimi-
nation that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of Due Process'." [citation omitted]. See
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) holding that "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."
21 Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 670 (1976), citing Weinberger, supra note 27, in holding
that the "[ejqual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment."
" 426 U.S. at 102.
" See note 12 supra.
1' 426 U.S. at 102. See note 26 supra.
31 See note 13 supra.
3 426 U.S. at 100. The appellate court's same treatment of the constitutional issue, Mow
Sun Wong v. Hampton, supra note 6, at 1040-41, drew some criticism. See Employment
Discrimination, supra note 11, at 370.
1 426 U.S. at 100.
3 Id.
1 Id. at 102-05. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 506-07 (1959), looking for explicit
authorization where due process violations are claimed.
11 426 U.S. at 108-09. The Hampton court in reviewing the history of the Civil Service
Commission determined that it was established by the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883.
Civil Service Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). While this legislation was being debated in the Senate,
that body considered and rejected a bill that would have limited Civil Service appointments
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direct the Civil Service Commission to require citizenship as a prerequis-
ite.Y Since there was no express authorization from a proper governing
body, the Court then looks for interests within the Civil Service Commis-
sion itself which would be reasonably related to the regulation.3 9 Finding
no justification for the discrimination the Court holds the regulation un-
constitutional.4 0
In this summary disposition of the case, the Hampton court not only
avoided resolving the differences between the protection offered under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments," but also left open the question of
whether the national interest identified by the Civil Service Commission
as a justification for the rule would support a regulation of this kind if
bolstered by authorization from the Congress or the President.2 Early in
the opinion, the Hampton court hinted at a double standard of review
under the fifth amendment, giving discriminatory Congressional and Ex-
ecutive edicts greater latitude than those of a federal agency.' 3 A recent
Executive Order," virtually identical to the Civil Service regulation over-
to citizens. Apparently, many Senators assumed that citizenship would be a requirement for
employment in the Civil Service. They believed that a regulation by the Commission would
be more appropriate than a legislative enactment.
However, in 1938, Congress tried to indirectly impose the citizenship requirement on the
Commission by denying compensation to federal employees unless they were citizens or owed
allegiance to the United States, were presently employed by the federal government, or were
employed only because of a shortage of qualified citizen applicants. Independent Offices
Appropriation Bill, 52 Stat. 410, 435 (1938). This standard was substantially relaxed by a
series of subsequent enactments.
426 U.S. at 109-14.
' The Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1966) provides:
The President may-
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil
service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character, knowledge,
and ability for the employment sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to make inquiries for the
purpose of this section.
Arguably, citizenship is a proper objective only in reference to "character, knowledge, or
ability" as required for employment. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 210. Exec. Order
No. 10,577, § 2.1 provides in part: "(a) The [Civil Service) Commission is authorized to
establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education, training and experience ...
or other requirements which applicants must meet to be admitted to or rated in examina-
tions." 3 C.F.R. 84 (Supp. 1954); 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1966).
426 U.S. at 114-16.
' See notes 33-35 supra.
4 426 U.S. at 104-05.
, Id. at 103, stating "if the rule were expressly mandated by the Congress or the President,
we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact
give rise to its adoption." Compare this dictum with the minimum rationality test of the old
equal protection analysis which presumed a set of facts to sustain legislation.
" Exec. Order No. 11,935, supra note 3. This order states:
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turned here, will eventually force the Court to expand its dictum and
determine whether the President will have to justify his acts by a showing
of compelling governmental interests or merely by meeting the traditional
minimum rationality. 5 Hopefully, the Court, aware that the two-tiered
equal protection analysis under the fourteenth amendment has been less
than universally satisfactory, 6 will not establish the same confusing ap-
proach to "equal protection" or "liberty" questions under the fifth amend-
ment.
If the Court wishes to impose a single judicial test to these two situa-
tions, it should first settle the dispute as to the extent of the protection
afforded under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. If the viola-
tions under the two amendments require the same analysis, then each
government, whether state or federal, should be required to justify its
discriminatory regulations on the basis of governmental interest. Pressing
national concerns may well override individual rights more often than state
interests do, but the federal government's enhanced ability to withstand
judicial scrutiny does not mean the fifth amendment's protection of indi-
vidual rights should be less rigorous than that of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Sheryl A. Newberry
(a) No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless such person
is a citizen or national of the United States.
(b) No person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service unless
such person is a citizen or national of the United States.
(c) The Commission may, as an exception to this rule and to the extent permit-
ted by law, authorize the appointment of aliens to positions in the competitive
service when necessary to promote the efficiency of the service in specific cases or
for temporary appointments.
, See notes 11 and 14 supra for a changing analysis under the equal protection clause and
note 43 supra hinting at the different standard for executive action.
" Note 14 supra.
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